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Neil MacCormick and Transnational Legal Theory: 
Reconstructing the Legacy 
 
Maksymilian Del Mar 
 
 
By personal disposition and political conviction, I am a diffusionist.1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Reading as I am, again and again, through the entire MacCormick corpus, it is 
difficult not to attempt to discern strands – thick or thin – that hold the entirety 
together. This is despite best efforts to recognise the false starts, retractions, dead 
ends, and all manner of wanderings of any one scholarly mind: in short, despite 
acknowledging the episodic, spiky, and opportunistic character of thought over time.2 
Certainly, some of the ideas are best read as having been articulated at a very specific 
time and place, in response to such-and-such stimulus (whether another’s scholar’s 
argument or a political event), and I recognise the duty for anyone confronting such a 
project of paying close attention to the appropriately contextualised shifts and changes 
from one particular flowering of theoretical expression to the next.3 However, reading 
these works over and over, one cannot but hear certain echoes and rhymes, both in 
style and substance, over the period of MacCormick’s publishing career, from 1966 to 
2011.4  
 I will not attempt to articulate all of these echoes and rhymes here, but there is 
one I want to highlight that will accompany me throughout: MacCormick’s 
commitment to the diffusion of power. This is not so much a theory or even a claim, 
as it is a character trait or a mark of temperament. It is something at once nebulous 
and robust. It colours, like a dye, not only the particular claims he makes in moral, 
legal and political philosophy – perhaps most obviously, the value he ascribes to 
individual moral autonomy and to ‘democracy at many levels’5 – but also what he 
looks for and finds in those past thinkers that he keeps returning to throughout his 
                                                 
 Department of Law, Queen Mary, University of London. Warm thanks to François Tanguay-Renaud 
and Michael Giudice for the invitation. This paper is part of research on ‘Neil MacCormick: Law, 
Philosophy and Politics’ conducted thanks to a Leverhulme Research Fellowship.  
1 Neil MacCormick, ‘The Dialectic of Might and Right’, 1998, 62. 
2 This may remind some MacCormick readers of how he characterised the experience of law for the 
ordinary citizen (see ‘The Ideal and the Actual of Law and Society’, in J. Tasioulas (ed.), Law, Values 
and Social Practices, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997, 15-37, 22-23). 
3 As David Armitage puts it: ‘Ideas emerged from tightly defined spaces, from littoral beaches as well 
as laboratory benches, and from public houses as well as royal academies. When viewed 
microscopically in this way, the seamless web of abstract knowledge turned out to be a brittle mosaic 
of contingent concerns’ (Foundations of Modern International Thought, Cambridge, 2012, 22). 
4 MacCormick died in 2009, but the last publication he authorised appeared in 2011. 
5 ‘Democracy at Many Levels’ (one of the titles of MacCormick’s contributions to the European 
Parliament). 
Note to readers: please note that this paper is prepared solely as a 
draft for discussion at Osgoode Hall Law School on 29 November 
2013. Please do not cite. Apologies for the incomplete footnotes 
and bibliography. 
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career, most especially his fellow past Scots. Thus, part of my aim in this paper is to 
take this character trait or mark of temperament as a guide to MacCormick’s thought, 
but also as a reminder of the importance of looking more broadly, I dare say more 
deeply, when evaluating the legacy of a thinker for a particular area of present 
scholarly endeavour. 
 That area, for the purposes of this paper, is transnational legal theory, and my 
task – put more prosaically – is to consider what MacCormick has been seen to have 
contributed to it, and to argue for my own take on his legacy. Thus, in the first part of 
the paper, I will be looking at some – really a small, but important sample – of the 
explicit engagements with MacCormick’s work by those whose work can be broadly 
characterised as falling within transnational legal theory. I will be evaluating their 
evaluations of MacCormick’s contribution. In doing so, my aim is (re)constructive, 
namely I want to pick out what those reading MacCormick find worrisome and what 
they find promising, and I want to use that as a springboard for the second part of the 
paper. There, I attempt, again incompletely and but hinting at future work to be done, 
to (re)construct MacCormick’s legacy for transnational legal theory.  
If there is an overall message, it is this: MacCormick’s commitment to the 
diffusion of power leaves an important legacy for transnational legal theory. 
MacCormick’s institutional theory of law needs to be read in light of this 
commitment. Within this commitment, what looms large is the space MacCormick 
leaves free for the exercise of practical reason by norm-users, including respecting 
what they take to be valuable (e.g. their civic institutions). Further, wrapped up in that 
commitment is the body of work that MacCormick keeps returning to, as if to refresh 
his academic appetite, namely that of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. For 
it is in that body of work that MacCormick finds nourishment for his commitment to 
the diffusion of power, and an antidote to what he sees – on the other side, so to speak 
– as the ‘sovereigntist tendency’ of Bentham, Austin and Dicey (and others since 
then, not least of all in the political theatres of the United Kingdom and the European 
Union).  
Placing MacCormick amongst the Scots is not to attempt to characterise him 
as part of some antagonistic Tartan army, defiantly fighting off any whiff of 
sovereignty or absolute, centralised power from down south – for MacCormick 
engaged honesty and earnestly with English jurisprudence, learnt a lot from it and 
taught us all a lot about it. But it is to say that we do a grave injustice to 
MacCormick’s legacy if we neglect his own life-long sources of inspiration, such as 
were Lord Stair, David Hume, and Adam Smith, to mention but three of the leading 
ones.  
Put in its most unrestrained form, the paper can be taken to be making a plea 
for greater attention to be paid to Scottish jurisprudence, both in terms of its 
descriptive virtues – with its historically-sensitive study of law in society – and its 
normative commitments – again, its distrust of power. Such attention would, or so I 
boldly suggest, pay particularly great dividends in the context of transnational legal 
theory. 
 
 
I. Reading MacCormick’s Readers 
 
Lest anything that follows sounds defensive, let me reiterate that my aim in engaging 
with the responses to MacCormick’s work below is to understand how he has been 
read: what have scholars focused on in reading him, and what have they picked out as 
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strengths and as weaknesses. My focus is on those theorists who have considered 
MacCormick’s contribution to transnational legal theory broadly conceived, including 
most obviously his theoretical work on the European Union.  
 
 
I.A. From Radical Pluralism to Pluralism under International Law 
 
The unfortunate focus of a good deal of those who engage with MacCormick’s legacy 
for transnational legal theory is on his (in)famous transition from radical pluralism 
(RP) to pluralism under international law (PUIL). I will be returning to 
MacCormick’s own statements about this transition – some of what he said, certainly 
did not did not help his own cause – and I will be pleading that we read it narrowly, 
marginalising it in our evaluation of MacCormick’s legacy. Amongst the responses to 
this transition, there are roughly three groups: first, those that would have preferred 
MacCormick to stick with the original endorsement of RP (here, Nico Krisch’s 2011 
paper serves as an exemplar of this position); second, those who think the move to 
PUIL was the right one, but urge a re-interpretation of what PUIL means (Pavlos 
Eleftheriadis’ 2010 paper is the best example of this position); and, third, those who 
are satisfied with neither RP or PUIL, including those who nevertheless wish to build 
on aspects of MacCormick’s theory in carving out a middle ground between, or a 
third way beyond, RP and PUIL (a prominent example of this effort is Neil Walker’s 
2011 paper). Let me briefly give an account of each of these positions.6 
 Krisch’s characterises MacCormick’s transition from RP and PUIL as a matter 
of succumbing to certain fears and anxieties about ‘political stability’ (Krisch 2011, 
387). According to Krisch, MacCormick comes over time, like others, such as 
Mireille Delmas-Marty, to soften or tame his initial pluralistic enthusiasm, and looks 
around for ‘overarching rules’ – some form of law that can help resolve conflicts 
between different systems of law (in this case, the European and the National Member 
State systems in the European Union). PUIL, says Krisch, is, ‘in fact a monist 
conception’,7 though one that retains what Krisch calls ‘institutional pluralism’ 
(where there is no internal hierarchy, but where the institutions in question operate 
under common rules), and one ‘held together by the overarching international legal 
obligation of both member states and the EU to cooperate and honour their 
commitments vis-à-vis each other’ (Krisch 2011, 388). What MacCormick was doing, 
says Krisch, is attempting to ‘limit the negative consequences of the original idea’ of 
                                                 
6 I am ignoring here the bulk of the burgeoning literature on constitutional pluralism in the European 
context simply because although much of it acknowledges MacCormick as the originator of the idea of 
‘constitutional pluralism’, few of it engages with his work in any detail. In terms of the 
acknowledgement, one can quote Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek from their introduction to their 
excellent collection, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart, 2012) 
who say: ‘The idea of constitutional pluralism first emerged in the context of European integration. 
Neil MacCormick can be named as its “founding father”’ (2). MacCormick then appears only in 5 of 
the 16 chapters, in all of which his work is cited but not discussed. Another acknowledgement appears 
in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis’s introduction to their equally excellent collection, The 
Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford, 2012), where they say that ‘the legal 
philosopher who examined the question [as to how philosophy of law bears upon the law of the EU] 
with the greatest thoroughness and whose work has had most lasting effect is Neil MacCormick’ (4, fn. 
4).  
7 Which belies a turn-around from what was a criticism of Kelsen in earlier work, such as MacCormick 
1993 – Krisch repeats here MacCormick’s acknowledgement of Catharine Richmond’s 1997 paper on 
Kelsen, which MacCormick had said influenced his change of heart with respect to Kelsen.  
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RP, providing legal tools in order to ‘avoid fragmentation in the EU’ (Krisch 2011, 
393).  
Krisch acknowledges (and I will be coming back to this point) that 
MacCormick was responding to a particular interpretation and application of his own 
pluralist vision in Ross Phelan’s Revolt or Revolution?: The Constitutional 
Boundaries of the European Community (1997) (Krisch 2011, 392), which fastened, 
in particular, on earlier statements by MacCormick (e.g. from 1995) that it was up to 
national courts ‘to interpret the interaction of the validity of EC law with higher level 
of norms of validity in any given system’ (quoted at Krisch 2011, 392). He also 
suggests that the political environment in the late 1990s, in both Europe and the UK, 
was such that RP could be used (as it was by Phelan) not to undermine and question 
state sovereignty, but in fact to strengthen it – a strategy that Krisch suggests 
MacCormick would have been keen to avoid (given that he was about to enter the 
European Parliament in 1999) (Krisch 2011, 393). But where MacCormick might 
have been enthusiastic about Europe at this time, he was, Krisch suggests, less 
hopeful about politics (Krisch 2011, 396), preferring to place greater trust in the ‘law 
and judicial bodies’ as being ‘more likely than political mechanisms to create order 
and stability in society’ (Krisch 2011, 395).  Law was to be preferred because it set up 
‘a fixed frame for interaction’; what legal structures do is:  
 
…lengthen the shadow of the future and stabilise cooperation beyond the 
immediate cost-benefit calculation of the actors involved; they set up 
institutions and assign powers in a way that abstracts from immediate 
situational pressures and interests. This helps to detach cooperation from the 
constant shifts in the underlying constellation of preferences and allows it to 
endure even if a certain set of actors is dissatisfied with it. Creating an 
overarching legal frame thus bears the promise of a more lasting 
institutionalisation, and the thicker the frame, the greater seems to be the 
promise. (Krisch 2011, 398) 
 
As mentioned above, Krisch laments the fact that MacCormick gave up on RP, and 
proceeds, in the remainder of his paper, to articulate ‘certain advantages in a truly 
“radically” pluralist structure in which fundamental questions – about the scope of the 
polity, ultimate supremacy norms, key values – are bracketed and worked around’ 
(Krisch 2011, 407). Krisch’s ability – portrayed so vividly and rigorously in his 2010 
book – to reveal the rough ground of interaction between institutions within and 
beyond Europe is impressive. His analysis of the way in which ‘conflicts of principle’ 
can be ‘bracketed’, remaining unresolved, but with relationships between the relevant 
institutions maintained through pragmatic processes of incremental mutual 
accommodation, is one of the most important and original contributions to 
transnational legal theory in recent times. This is not the moment to address it any 
further. What is important for my purposes is that Krisch sees MacCormick as having 
regrettably moved away from those virtues of a truly radical pluralism.  
 The second group of theorists are those who endorse MacCormick’s transition 
from RP to PUIL. Most prefer not to retain the use of that label – PUIL – for example, 
José Menéndez (2011) characterises the change as one from RP to ‘moderate 
constitutional pluralism’, and evaluates it as ‘a change of critical importance, which 
increases, not diminishes, the coherence between MacCormick’s overall legal-
theoretical project and his European constitutional theory’ (Menéndez 2011, 227). 
According to Menéndez, ‘moderate constitutional pluralism’ introduced something 
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that was missing from RP, namely ‘the regulatory ideal of the single legal order that 
law can serve as an institutionalised alternative to spontaneous order’ (Menéndez 
2011, 227). But, as signalled above, the most extensive and sophisticated defence of 
MacCormick’s transition comes courtesy of a 2010 paper by Pavlos Eleftheriadis.  
 Eleftheriadis also finds the PUIL label ‘mistaken’ (2010, 384), arguing that, 
properly understood, it is a form of dualism. He begins by noting that there are two 
interpretations of the RP stance: first, double-monism; and second, disjunctive 
monism. The former holds that there are ‘two inconsistent hierarchies and we accept 
them both’, for what we have in effect are two monisms: ‘If we are within the national 
jurisdiction, then national monism is correct. If we are within the EU jurisdiction and 
institutions, EU monism is correct’ (Eleftheriadis 2010, 373). The second, disjunctive 
monism, is ‘pluralism proper, because the answer would be entirely open-ended’: 
‘Sometimes the national law wins, whereas others the European law wins’, for on this 
position ‘Courts may help themselves to either of these two monisms. In other words, 
it is open to them to endorse either a solution derived from national law or a solution 
derived from EU law’ (Eleftheriadis 2010, 374). Eleftheriadis does not like either 
position, though he has particular scorn for the second, which he argues, on the back 
of Dworkin, ‘compromises or rejects integrity’ (Eleftheriadis 2010, 374).8 More 
broadly, according to Eleftheriadis, RP ‘essentially affirms both hierarchies at the 
same time and then adds that there is no reason to regret the incoherence’ 
(Eleftheriadis 2010, 373). In doing so, it ‘assumes that the two systems are not 
actually communicating’ (Eleftheriadis 2010, 372).9  
 As noted above, Eleftheriadis defends the move to PUIL, but under the guise 
of a dualist interpretation of it. What is crucial here, says Eleftheriadis, is that we 
recognise that dualism ‘is not national monism’ (2010, 369 & 381). Neither is it, he 
adds, international monism. From the domestic side, dualism ‘does not advise us to 
ignore international law’; on the contrary, it ‘recognises the role of international law 
in the domain of relations between states and related problems’, and dualist courts 
‘can be’ and often are ‘deferential to international sources and institutions’ 
(Eleftheriadis 2010, 381). Similarly, from the international law side, a dualist position 
‘recognises certain legal relations remain in the exclusive power of national 
jurisdictions, whose laws and procedures determine certain things authoritatively’ 
(Eleftheriadis 2010, 384). In the result,  
 
…the relations of municipal and international law are characterised by a 
mutually compatible dualism. This is made harmonious not by a supposedly 
                                                 
8 It is not entirely clear what is the problem with double monism. Eleftheriadis says that ‘it implies that 
in areas of law where the orders overlap, the same judge should look at the case both from his own 
perspective and the perspective of the EU legal order. And this is the main problem with this analysis. 
It suggests we endorse a constitutional framework and at the same not endorse it. Looked at more 
closely, double monism can give way to disjunctive monism’ (2010, 377). To look at a case from the 
perspectives of two systems is not necessarily to endorse one or the other: it seems conceivable that one 
can show some interpretive deference to each system in a process of mutual accommodation, thereby 
endorsing the limited validity of both.   
9 In fact, Eleftheriadis goes further and suggests that insofar as MacCormick thinks that RP imposes a 
moral or other political duty on the ECJ not to reach its interpretive judgements without regard to their 
potential impact on national constitutions, and vice versa, then ‘it prevents the judge from respecting 
the official monist position of his constitutional framework. It looks like an invitation to be disloyal to 
monism, i.e. disloyal to one’s own constitution’ (2010, 376). This strikes me as too strong: surely it is 
possible that one can ‘have regard’ to the impact of an interpretive judgement on another system 
without necessarily being disloyal to one’s own constitution. ‘Having regard’ does not seem to be as 
demanding as that.  
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higher institution imposing uniformity…but by the substantive content of the 
applicable rules (and I believe that this is the position that MacCormick had in 
mind under the mistaken label pluralism under international law). This makes 
it possible for the domestic constitutional doctrine to take seriously the claims 
of international or European law. Integrity is achieved because the 
international law respects in principle the claims of the constitutional order 
and vice versa. It is achieved through mutual deference. (Eleftheriadis 2010, 
384) 
 
At one point, Eleftheriadis characterises this approach as one in which ‘the various 
legal orders…are thus thoroughly merged in the best reasoning about the case’ (2010, 
384), which would chime well with his call for ‘integrity’: ‘Integrity in law requires 
that national and European judges and officials speak, as far as possible, with the 
same voice according to the interpretive devices of fit and integrity’ (2010, 380). But 
it is not entirely clear where the ‘merger’ or the ‘same voice’ is in an approach that 
allows each system to only ever defer, or pay respect to, the other on its own terms – 
when it has determined that it is appropriate for it to do so. Certainly, dualism (seeing 
it here from the perspective of the domestic) may not be ‘a doctrine denying the 
effects of international or foreign law’ (2010, 384), but this is always on the terms of 
domestic law, i.e. it is ‘always the national forum’ (2010, 382) that decides whether or 
not international law is encroaching upon its own order. The premise here seems to be 
that both national and international law have clearly demarcated fields, and that all 
that will be required for mutual respect will be respecting ‘the field of application of 
the other’ (2010, 384). But of course the issue is bound to be: who gets to decide the 
scope of the field of application? If we could set the parameters of each field in 
advance, such that all that would be needed would be deference to another’s fields 
when they apply, there would never be any conflict. Conflict arises because we cannot 
agree on what is the proper field of application.  
 In any event – and the above analysis is no doubt too quick10 – it is clear that 
for Eleftheriadis, the move from RP to PUIL (though without that as the label) is a 
promising one. If nothing else, says Eleftheriadis, MacCormick’s transition reminds 
us that we need to analyse the relation between European law and domestic law in the 
context of international law. As he puts it, ‘The project of articulating a political and 
legal theory of the EU must…proceed by taking the international dimension much 
more seriously’ (2010, 388).  
  The third and final group of theorists engaging with MacCormick’s transition 
are those who are not happy with either RP or PUIL, and that aim to find something in 
between or beyond. The theorists in this camp want to endorse the non-hierarchical 
spirit of the early position, but they want to find something more principled and more 
structured to regulate the heterarchical relations in question. Thus, Daniel Halberstam 
says that he wants to capture a form of pluralism that is: 
 
…radical yet grounded. It is radical in the sense of lacking any overarching 
hierarchy or tie-breaker. And yet it is grounded in the sense of being a 
principled practice of contest and accommodation based in the common 
enterprise of interlocking systems of limited collective self-governance. In my 
view, this goes beyond MacCormick and the comfortable middle ground 
                                                 
10 Perhaps Eleftheriadis means something stronger by his ‘best reasoning about the case’, but if that is 
so, this is not explained clearly (indeed it is somewhat undermined) by talk of ‘mutual respect’ about 
each other’s ‘field of application’.  
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occupied by all right-minded people who are just muddling through. 
(Halberstam 2012, 288) 
 
Theorists here want to build on MacCormick, sometimes finding resources within 
MacCormick’s corpus, and sometimes from without – but what is clear is that they 
neither endorse RP nor PUIL. Some theorists approach this, as does Halberstam, by 
strengthening pluralism, and others, by softening unification.  
 Neil Walker’s 2011 paper is a good example of a theorist finding resources 
within MacCormick’s own corpus to carve out a space between RP and PUIL, but 
doing so primarily by offering a softer, more subtle account of unity. Walker offers a 
very helpful summary of what he calls ‘MacCormick’s dilemma’ (others, such as 
Halberstam, called it ‘MacCormick’s puzzle’ (Halberstam 2012, 288):  
 
But to demonstrate the plurality of normative orders within the European legal 
space is not yet to demonstrate their pluralism. It is one thing to claim that the 
EU legal configuration is made up of multiple overlapping legal systems. It is 
quite another to show how these systems interact and cohere in a sustainable 
fashion. Here, then, we approach the hors of MacCormick’s enduring 
dilemma. On the one hand, if it is mere plurality that he is portraying, then it is 
not clear that he is adding anything, theoretically, to our understanding of 
how, if at all, law sounds and connects beyond the boundaries of a particular 
legal order. Neither is it clear that he is adding anything, practically, to our 
understanding of how the particular multi-order configuration known as the 
EU works and sustains itself over time. On the other hand, to the extent that he 
is able to show us how law functions qua law beyond the boundaries of the 
legal order, how, if at all, can he do so without turning plurality back into a 
new kind of systemic unity that necessarily denies the distinctiveness and 
independence of the parts? (Walker 2011, 376)  
 
Like others, some of whom we have encountered above, what Walker finds 
unsatisfactory about RP is the lack of ‘relationship between the different constituent 
legal systems of the European legal configuration’ (Walker 2011, 376). There are 
‘bridging mechanisms’, but these are ‘relationally contingent in their content’ and 
‘system-specific in their basis of authority and interpretation’, with the consequence 
that ‘avoidance of conflict could not be guaranteed all the way down’ (Walker 2011, 
376-7).11 If RP is not the answer, then neither is PUIL, for this ‘invocation of a 
supervening international law’ appears to be ‘simply the way to a new form of 
normative unity and therefore a transcendence and so a denial of the very pluralism’ 
that MacCormick was trying to embrace (see Walker 2011, 378-9). According to 
Walker, what McCormick can be taken to be searching for, and what we ought to 
attempt to construct in his absence, is ‘some notion of a unity of law standing beyond 
particular legal systems, but a unity which was not conceivable in terms of a new 
system to which the original legal systems would inevitably become subordinate’ 
(Walker 2011, 379). As he puts it towards the end of his paper, this has to be ‘an 
approach that offers something between the jurisdictional closure of legal-normative 
order and the anormative openness of strategic geopolitics as the elusive glue of the 
new pluralist transnational configuration’ (Walker 2011, 383).  
                                                 
11 The scenario is even worse in other non-European transnational contexts, where there are no such 
bridging mechanisms, or cultural / political supports: see Walker 2011, 378.  
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 In searching for such an approach, Walker considers three options, or as he 
puts it, three kinds of universalism: first, ‘covering-law universalism’, which would 
require ‘either the global recognition of a powerful strain of natural law or a robust 
framework of positive law’ (Walker 2011, 379); second, ‘reiterative universalism’, 
which would depend on the principles of legality, subsidiarity, adequate participation 
and accountability, public reason and rights protection (see Walker 2011, 380); or, 
and this is his preference, ‘methodological universalism’, which is about approaching 
issues in a law-like manner, but without pretensions to universalistic status.  
 There are a number of interesting features of this proposal by Walker. First, as 
noted above, Walker looks within MacCormick’s own corpus for the resources for 
articulating this position – and he finds it in MacCormick’s last statement on practical 
reason (in MacCormick 2008). Second, Walker is analogising from an ‘inter-personal 
level’ to an ‘inter-systemic level’ (Walker 2011, 381). And third, what Walker is 
constructing is a norm of reasoning, what he calls a ‘inter-systemic non-law of 
universalisability of justification’ (Walker 2011, 383), the most clear statement of 
which is that ‘if each is committed to the universalisability of its reasoning in the 
concrete case, and to the defence of that universal reasoning before an (implicit) 
audience of significant others which includes all within the relevant community of 
exchange, then a productive normative dynamic becomes imaginable’ (Walker 2011, 
382). I do not wish to evaluate the specific proposal here, but I do wish to highlight 
this strategy, in particular the strategy of broadening out one’s engagement with a 
thinker, and his or her legacy, by drawing on what might appear, at first blush, to be 
sources of his or her work that deal with other, unrelated problems. For we must be 
slow to accuse someone who was as alert a listener to other people’s arguments and as 
sympathetic a reader of other people’s work (Walker 2011, 373), as MacCormick 
clearly was, of not providing us with sufficient resources for understanding the quality 
of relationships between transnational institutions or orders.  
 
 
I.B. Casting the Net Wider 
 
Walker’s strategy offers a neat bridge to this next section. In it, I want to point to the 
responses of some theorists to MacCormick’s work who have not focused exclusively 
on the above transition from RP to PUIL, but picked out other resources in 
MacCormick’s treatment of these and other (sometimes at first glance unrelated) 
problems. My aim here is not to be comprehensive: it is simply to identify some 
resources, picked up by other theorists, which we can incorporate into a more 
thorough reconstruction of the legacy of MacCormick for transnational legal theory.  
 One of the most interesting contemporary engagements with MacCormick’s 
work is that of Keith Culver’s and Michael Giudice’s. Their most comprehensive 
treatment of MacCormick to date can be found in their 2010 book, Legality’s Borders. 
MacCormick comes in for some criticism in this book, partly in relation to his 
transition from RP to PUIL – in this respect, Culver and Giudice question how 
MacCormick’s view is different from Kelsen’s monism, and whether he ‘successfully 
freed legal theory from hierarchical ways of thinking about legality, especially since it 
appears that his view amounts to a plurality of hierarchies’ (Culver and Giudice 2010, 
71) – and partly also in terms of the object of MacCormick’s institutionalism, which 
according to Culver and Giudice is constrained both by focusing on ‘institutional 
normative orders such as the EU, which already enjoys a high degree of systematicity’ 
(2010, 98) and by ‘supposing the epistemological priority of state law, a highly 
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institutional form of legality’ (2010, 99), with the consequence that MacCormick’s 
approach may make it difficult to capture ‘inchoate forms and emerging forms of 
legality as they emerge, for which a general jurisprudence ought to be able to account’ 
(2010, 99).  
 For present purposes, it is the second of these criticisms that is of particular 
relevance. By carefully examining MacCormick’s institutionalism, and analysing it in 
light of the need, so keenly felt at the transnational level, of attention to emergent 
social dynamics, Culver and Giudice very helpfully cast the net wider in our 
evaluation of MacCormick’s legacy for transnational legal theory. Although I cannot 
hope to do justice to their analysis of MacCormick or their own theory here, two 
points are important to highlight.  
 The first is Culver and Giudice’s commitment to inhabiting the perspective ‘of 
the ordinary person in the developed world’ (2010, 105). Here is how they elaborate: 
 
Legality and legal norms certainly have a particular practical force in our 
ordinary person’s life, but their nature and force is not well-represented by 
metaphors of ladders or chains of authority. Rather, a spatial metaphor seems 
better suited: in the complex web of norms of various kinds encountered by 
citizens, legal norms represent a kind of upwelling of normative force, 
especially forceful standards clustered around particular kinds of life events, 
relatively stable normative reference points in a context of constant 
competition amongst norms. To be sure, the distinction between legal and 
non-legal norms is still of interest to this perspective, but it is focused 
primarily on the fact of clusters of emerging, continuing, varying, and 
declining legality and their interaction with one another. (Culver and Giudice 
2010, 105) 
 
Culver and Giudice note that although ‘a debt is owed to MacCormick’s recognition 
of the operational nature of institutions of law as complexes of multi-norm, interactive 
practices’, they add that ‘what MacCormick leaves incomplete is an account of how 
legal institutions combine to produce the complex institutional formations our 
ordinary citizen encounters in the globalising world of the 21st century’ (2010, 124). 
My guess is that MacCormick would have been sympathetic to the perspective 
adopted by Culver and Giudice. In his later development of his institutional theory, 
MacCormick emphasises what he calls ‘the primacy of norm-users’, and although his 
point is to limit the tendency to prioritise norm-giving and norm-making in legal 
theory, the perspective of the norm-user is one he would have recognised as 
fundamental to any legal theoretical project.  
 The second point is one that also makes an appearance in the quote above, 
namely Culver and Giudice’s sensitivity to the temporal dimension of (transnational) 
legality. This also happens to be one of most persistent complaints raised by Culver 
and Giudice against MacCormick’s institutionalism. Their criticism is based, in large 
part, on Gerald Postema’s (2004) argument that MacCormick ‘understands the life of 
legal system as a set of continuous instances of momentary validity, with each 
“moment” guaranteed by the fact that it is rooted in the practice of official 
recognition’, and that, as a result, what he misses is the kind of normative coherence 
that occurs over time (see Culver and Giudice 2010, 109). Accordingly, Culver and 
Giudice argue that ‘More must be done to explain how legal institutions relate to one 
another in a legal order, and in that relation constitute an identity over time, 
discernibly different from adjacent and distant separate legal and non-legal orders and 
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institutions’ (Culver and Giudice 2010, 123; emphasis added). In this respect, 
MacCormick’s institutional theory of law ‘is certainly on the right track in identifying 
the operational nature of law as a plurality of norm-subjects engage one another in 
solving co-ordination problems, using law to support and advance moral goals’, but 
the approach ‘stops short of the fuller account needed to take seriously the role of 
clusters, orders, and even systems of legal institutions in protecting norm-subject’s 
expectations over time’ (2010, 123). We need, they say, a ‘narrative concept of law’ 
(2010, 110) – one that tracks patterns of ‘continued mutual reference’ in varying 
degrees of intensity (some evolving, some devolving and decaying) amongst a variety 
of institutional actors (again, with varying degrees of institutionalisation).  
 Culver and Giudice are right to raise the issue of how to conceive of the 
temporal dimension, particularly in the context of an institutional theory of law.12 
Further, their own approach – especially insofar as it builds in sensitivity to a variety 
of variables (including degrees of intensity, degrees of institutionalisation) – is both 
important and original. If the institutional theory of law is to have a future in the 
realm of the transnational, it must surely build on their efforts to take temporality 
seriously. What I would wish to add here is that this would have been welcome news 
to MacCormick, and to other institutional legal theorists. Culver and Giudice are not 
unaware of this – they cite, for example, a wonderful quote, which I cannot resist 
repeating, from Peter Morton’s reminder, in his own An Institutional Theory of Law 
(1998), of the pervasiveness of change in the world of institutions:   
 
…the most striking feature of [the institutional] world is its state of continuous 
change. In the world of social interaction nothing stands still; new activities 
emerge as new techniques are developed and new inventions are made; old 
activities die out or are merged with others; practices are rendered obsolete; 
new procedures emerge or are instituted; relationships between agencies are 
renegotiated; and so forth. All objects in this world are, in differing ways, 
vulnerable to incremental change or subject to deliberate destruction and 
reform. The vocabulary of the types of changes in this Heraclitean world 
makes the vocabulary of geomorphological or biological change seem 
poverty-stricken. (See Morton 1998, 4; quoted in Culver and Giudice 2010, 
140) 
 
They also mention the issue, which came up in several commentaries13 on 
MacCormick’s early institutionalism, of how to conceive of the creation of 
institutional facts.14 My point here is simple: MacCormick was sensitive to 
temporality, much more sensitive than Postema takes him to be.15 There are many 
illustrations of this, including not only the problems surrounding the creation of 
institutional facts, but also the transition from informal to formal speech acts (see 
MacCormick and Bankowski 1986), from normative order to institutional normative 
                                                 
12 They are surely right, too, that ‘sensitivity to law’s temporally dynamic nature becomes important to 
adequate explanation of the EU legal order’ (Culver and Giudice 2012, 75).  
13 Arnold 1979; Atria 2002; Bankowski 1989, and others.  
14 See Culver and Giudice 2010, 107, where they say that MacCormick recognises ‘that legal 
institutions and their constituent practices are in a sense parasitic upon social institutions whose 
ontological and practical status as social institutions is logically prior their emergence as legal 
institutions’. 
15 In this, and in other instances, Postema lumps MacCormick much too quickly along with Hart. 
Notice, for instance, Postema’s reading of MacCormick in his history of Legal Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century (2011) as but an extension of Hartian positivism (see 341-348).  
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order, and from heteronomy to autonomy at the level of individual moral 
development. ‘Genetic’ explanations of phenomena were one of MacCormick’s 
favourite kinds of explanations – and thus read more expansively, there are resources 
within his own oeuvre for (re)constructing the temporal dimension of the institutional 
theory of law.16  
 Zooming out for a moment, Culver and Giudice make it clear that insofar as 
we want to build on MacCormick’s institutionalism when theorising about 
transnational legality, we need to: 1) dig deeper and clarify the temporal dimension of 
the institutional theory of law; 2) get a clearer grasp of the different senses of 
‘institution’, including ‘institutionalisation’, at work in MacCormick’s writings;17 and 
3) locate this reconstruction of MacCormick’s institutionalism in a broader 
intellectual history of other institutional theories.18  
 Before completing this section, and also this part of the paper, it is important 
to notice that there are a number of other potentially useful resources (for 
transnational legal theory) in MacCormick’s oeuvre – these having been picked up by 
other commentators, perhaps especially to MacCormick’s Questioning Sovereignty 
(1999). The most striking of these is MacCormick’s recourse to the concept of a 
‘commonwealth’. As far as I can tell, the first scholar to highlight MacCormick’s use 
of this concept was Hans Lindahl, in a paper (1998) that responded to MacCormick’s 
‘Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the European Commonwealth’ (1997). 
For Lindahl, it was in particular ‘the idea of commonwealth’ which ‘promises to 
liberate legal theory from the conceptual straightjacket imposed by the state and state 
sovereignty’ (1998, 482). Later, in 2001, Lindahl returned to the idea of a 
commonwealth, saying of it that it ‘opens up the possibility of understanding a polity 
as a legal and political order, yet without falling prey to the basic stratagem of the 
doctrine of sovereign statehood’ (2001, 173). In particular, MacCormick’s use of the 
notion of commonwealth signified a break ‘with the centralisation and concentration 
of power typical of sovereign statehood’ and went ‘hand in hand theoretical and 
practical efforts to re-imagine collective self-government’ (Lindahl 2001, 176). 
Crucial here are the ideas of ‘1) pluralistic democracy; 2) national self-determination; 
and 3) a politics of negotiation’ (Lindahl 2001, 168). The kind of pluralism embraced 
by the idea of a commonwealth ‘endorses what might be called a politics of 
negotiation and dialogue, which strives to maximise voluntary co-operation’ (Lindahl 
2001, 170). The problem with sovereignty, which the promotion of the idea of a 
commonwealth is designed to highlight, is ‘nothing less than the problem concerning 
                                                 
16 They were also types of explanations commonly found amongst the philosophers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, a point I will return to. 
17 This was not something MacCormick was not aware of, and indeed, he sometimes used the fertility 
of possible meanings for certain purposes, as when, in his 1973 Inaugural Lecture, his insistence that 
law was institutional in two senses, one philosophical and the other sociological, was part and parcel of 
an attempt to show that both disciplines were vital for our understanding of law. I come back to this 
below. 
18 Although I cannot do this here, what this means is drawing in part on those MacCormick himself 
identified as relevant, perhaps especially Otto van Gierke, and others he arguably neglected, such as 
Santi Romano. Gierke would be a great starting point here, also given the links between his thinking 
and that of the early English pluralists, especially FW Maitland. As William Ewald (1998) pointed out 
in a comment on MacCormick, it is no surprise that both Gierke and Maitland were mediaevalists – 
there is a great deal that contemporary transnational legal theory can learn from the legal pluralism in 
place in mediaeval times. For a collection of the English pluralists, see Hirst 1993; and for a recent 
historical treatment of legal pluralism, with particular attention to 1500-1850, see Benton and Ross 
2013. For attempts to place MacCormick’s theory in the context of other institutional theories, see 
Croce and Salvatore 2007; Croce 2011; and now La Torre 2013.  
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the possibility of the “self-constitution of a community” and of the individual as a 
member of the community’ (Lindahl 2001, 176). As Lindahl puts it, connecting it to 
MacCormick’s general jurisprudence, what MacCormick is building up here is a 
‘genetic account of democratic legal order’ (Lindahl 2001, 177), one that tries to 
decrease the gap between legality and those that the law affects (its users). The notion 
of the commonwealth, then, brings to the fore the theme of the diffusion of power, but 
also, and crucially, helps us to see the link between that distrust of power and 
MacCormick’s theorising of both individual and communal autonomy, including 
nationalism. Further, as I shall repeat later, it is no coincidence that MacCormick’s 
use of the very idea of a commonwealth was inspired by a Scottish thinker – David 
Hume. The Scottishness of the entire approach shines through very clearly.  
 Lindahl was not the only scholar to pick up on MacCormick’s use of the 
concept of a commonwealth. Ian Ward, reviewing Questioning Sovereignty (1999), 
said that ‘one of the most challenging [concepts in the book] is the notion of 
‘commonwealth’ (Ward 2000, 79). It is worth quoting more of Ward’s assessment: 
  
MacCormick suggests that the reconfiguration of Europe may best be seen as a 
‘commonwealth’, and founds his thesis on the idea of a ‘perfect’ 
commonwealth articulated by David Hume. The idea of a commonwealth 
necessarily engages the political imagination; it speaks of zeal, and a 
belonging that is more than passive. The idea of active political participation is 
central. MacCormick makes much of ‘popular self-management’, and in doing 
so echoes a number of communitarian theses which have likewise attempted to 
marry self-government and participatory democracy. Good government, he 
repeatedly affirms, is self-government. It is no coincidence that so many 
communitarians, most obviously perhaps Michael Walzer and Michael Sandel, 
also found their theories of regenerated democracy in classical ideas of 
‘commonwealth’. (Ward 2000, 79) 
 
There is clearly here a body of work that can be turned to in (re)constructing the 
intellectual history of the idea of a commonwealth. It is good to remember, as Ward 
urges us to, that the idea is also one that surfaces in the English tradition, though it is 
interesting to observe that it was often used there – for instance via the notion of a 
‘commonwealth of commonwealths’ – as a concept ‘consciously deployed by those 
who effected the real centralisation of the English, and then British, state in the 16th to 
18th centuries’ (Ward 2000, 79). In that sense, it is no surprise that MacCormick 
focuses on the Scottish tradition.  
 The use of the notion of a commonwealth is connected to various other ideas, 
also referred to, indeed extensively so, by MacCormick, such as the idea of 
subsidiarity. For Joxerramon Bengoetxea, a former doctoral student of MacCormick’s 
and himself an important contributor to institutional legal theory at a transnational 
level (see Bengoetxea 1993), this idea of subsidiarity lies at the foundation of 
MacCormick’s ‘social-democratic liberal nationalism’, together with its commitment 
to the ‘proximity to the people and respect for the distinctiveness of collective civic 
institutions, legal and other traditions, and culture…[and] respect for persons as 
autonomous, self-determined contextual individuals’, including their capacity for 
sharing voluntary allegiance to certain civic institutions (see Bengoetxea 2011, 247). 
What is crucial here, as Bengoetxea recognises, is ‘a shift of focus…from hard 
conceptions which stress power, independence and non-interference from other 
powers, to softer or lighter conceptions based upon co-decision-making capacity in a 
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connected world of interdependence’ (Bengoetxea 2011, 246). This is a shift, needless 
to say, from the concentration to the diffusion of power.  
 
 
II. Reconstructing the Legacy  
 
In this second part of the paper, I aim to offer some hints for the reconstruction of 
MacCormick’s legacy for transnational legal theory. I do so in three steps: first, I look 
at MacCormick’s own interpretations of the Scottish thinkers he kept returning to, and 
consider what he found valuable to retain from their work – in particular, the 
commitment he draws from them to the diffusion of power; second, I build on that in 
re-telling, in very broad brushstrokes, the story of his general jurisprudence; and, 
third, I make some tentative (and embarrassingly brief) suggestions as to the 
importance of this reconstruction for transnational legal theory. 
 
 
II.A. A Note on the Transition from RP to PUIL 
 
Before launching into this sketchy reconstruction, let me make one comment about 
MacCormick’s above-discussed transition from RP to PUIL. I have already made a 
plea to ‘cast the net wider’ and not focus our efforts on reconstructing MacCormick’s 
legacy for transnational legal theory on this transition. To provide an extra motivation 
for this, let me repeat what Krisch (2011) noticed, namely, that MacCormick’s 
invocation of PUIL was, at least in large part, a response to what he saw as an 
alarming application of his RP to the EU. As noted above, the application in question 
was Phelan’s argument that sought to give, as MacCormick put it, ‘unbounded 
discretion to state courts in permitting, for the sake of the domestic constitution, 
limitation of the local effectiveness of Community law’ (MacCormick 1999, 120). 
This was precisely the kind of approach that MacCormick had been resisting with his 
original RP, so to find it used in this way must have come as a rather nasty shock. In 
looking around for what resource might be found to counter this application, and thus 
something that would pull states back in to a self-avowedly non-hierarchical relation 
with European institutions, MacCormick fastened onto international law. In other 
words, I think it is fair to read MacCormick as adding to his conception of RP the 
element of international law in order not to make the kind of move that Phelan was 
making impossible. Certainly, in adding it, he does not merely make it ‘a further non-
hierarchical interacting system’ (MacCormick 1999, 118). Instead, he argues that we 
ought to see the co-ordinate, non-hierarchical relationship between Member States 
and the European Union as authorised and conditioned by international law: 
according to PUIL, he says, ‘the obligations of international law set conditions upon 
the validity of state and of Community constitutions and interpretations thereof, and 
hence impose a framework on the interactive but not hierarchical relations between 
systems’ (MacCormick 1999, 118). But, overall, it seems reasonable to assert that 
MacCormick is using international law to discipline Member States: ‘it is a clear 
mutual international obligation of states’, he argues, ‘not to fragment the Community 
by unilateral decisions either judicial or legislative (or, for that matter, executive)’ 
(MacCormick 1999, 120). Why is that so? Well, because of ‘the origin of the 
Community in Treaties and the continuing normative significance of pacta sunt 
servanda, to say nothing of the fact that in respect of their Community membership 
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and otherwise the states owe each other obligations under international law’ 
(MacCormick 1999, 120).  
 MacCormick is of course aware that European Union law sees itself as distinct 
from international law. He says that ‘Community law is self-interpreted as being 
something other than a mere regional subset of norms of international law. And unless 
this were to be shown untenable or absurd, a theoretical account of the totality of 
juridical relationships in Europe should seek to accommodate it’ (MacCormick 1999, 
118). The same goes for Member States. The picture he wants to build is one in which 
international law functions to hold in check the claims of either the EU or the Member 
States to some kind of supremacy – something that would forestall the kind of non-
hierarchical, co-ordinate relationship that he believes is needed. At all times, 
international law is being used to balance and distribute power amongst the 
institutions of both the Member States and the EU:  
 
…state Courts have no right to assume an absolute superiority of state 
constitution over international good order, including the European dimensions 
of that good order. This is not the same as saying that they must simply defer 
to whatever the ECJ considers to be mandated by the European constitution. 
For its reading of that constitution and the state Court’s reading of its own 
constitution ought both to have regard to the international obligations which 
still subsist notwithstanding, or indeed because of, the fact that Community 
law is a ‘new legal order sui generis’. (MacCormick 1999, 121) 
 
But Phelan’s position practically forces him to play his cards forcefully – indeed so 
forcefully as to characterise his own position as ‘a monistic framework’ (MacCormick 
1999, 117). It is true that in addition to holding the Member States and the European 
Union in check, MacCormick suggests that international law can also serve as a 
resource for resolving conflicts – even to the extent that ‘in the event of an apparently 
irresoluble conflict arising between one or more national courts and the ECJ, there 
would always on this thesis be a possibility of recourse to international arbitration or 
adjudication to resolve the matter’ (MacCormick 1999, 121). Many, as we have seen 
above, have found these moves to be problematic, and also unrealistic.19 My plea 
would be that we see them in light of the overall purpose of the discussion in which 
these statements take place, i.e. primarily an attempt to show why and how Member 
States, and their courts, ought not make claims to supremacy, risking the 
fragmentation and demotion of European law.  
 But we can also take a further step back – back to the 1993 article, ‘Beyond 
the Sovereign State’, which launched this line of inquiry. There, MacCormick asked 
us to notice that it was possible to take seriously the perspectives of both the Member 
States and the European Union. His primary purpose, as I see it, was just that: to 
create the theoretical space for both viewpoints, refusing to accept that it was 
necessary to see either one or the other as superior or supreme. MacCormick certainly 
used the language of pluralism to characterise what he was doing, but perhaps the 
better term is ‘diffusionism’. The attack on the ‘monocular’ perspectives of various 
theorists can then be read as part of a more fundamental distaste of theories favouring 
centralisation and concentration of power. Diffusionism, as I have hinted at above, is 
                                                 
19 See also Miguel Maduro, who argues that ‘it is not clear how international law could give an 
appropriate and satisfactory legal solution to a potential conflict between the EU and a Member State’ 
(2003, 533).  
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less a claim about the state of (legal) affairs, and more a temperament or trait of 
character – at its strongest, perhaps, a research direction or agenda. And it is one 
which I think emerged clearly in the following moving passage from that paper: 
 
Can we think of a world in which our normative existence and our practical 
life are anchored in, or related to, a variety of institutional systems, each of 
which has validity or operation in relation to some range of concerns, none of 
which is absolute over all the others, and all of which, for most purposes, can 
operate without serious mutual conflict in areas of overlap? If this is possible 
practically as it clearly is conceptually, it would involve a diffusion of political 
power centres as well as of legal authorities. It would depend on a high degree 
of relatively willing co-operation and a relatively low degree of coercion in its 
direct and naked forms. It would create space for a real and serious debate 
about the demands of subsidiarity. (MacCormick 1993, 17) 
 
There is, in this passage, a broader, far-reaching vision than simply one of describing 
the co-existence of two legal orders in Europe. It is a vision that we ought to, and can, 
respect and further flesh out by taking into account a greater range of both 
MacCormick’s inspirations and his contributions to scholarship.  
 
 
II.B. MacCormick amongst the Scots 
 
The first step in the reconstruction of the above-mentioned vision, but also 
MacCormick’s legacy as a whole, ought to be the intellectual tradition from which 
MacCormick gained so much nourishment, namely the Scottish Enlightenment 
heritage, and its rare and wonderful mix of moral, legal and political philosophy, 
sociology and history. It is time, then, to switch tracks, and move from reading 
MacCormick’s readers to reading those who MacCormick read. Of course, this paper 
is not the time and place for a full review of these sources: my aim is simply to whet 
the appetite, and show how consistently important they were for MacCormick, and 
thus how vital it is to engage with them when reconstructing his legacy.20  
 MacCormick’s earliest writings engage with Scottish thinkers. Even his very 
first published article, ‘Can Stare Decisis be Abolished?’ (1966), which ostensibly 
deals with the-then fresh decision of the House of Lords that they would no longer 
apply the strict rules of stare decisis to their own past judgements, drew both on the 
practice of the Scottish Court of Session as well as on what MacCormick called ‘the 
rationale of the force of judicial decisions…given by the Scottish Institutionalists’ 
(MacCormick 1966, 202). One of his last articles was entitled: ‘Stair and the Natural 
Law Tradition: Still Relevant?’ (2009), the focus of which is obvious enough, and 
indeed rounds off nicely an almost-40 year effort (beginning with ‘Ius Quaesitum 
Tertio: Stair v Dunedin’, in 1970) reminding readers of legal theory and legal 
scholarship of the importance of James Dalrymple, First Viscount of (and later simply 
Lord) Stair. And all in between, in every decade, MacCormick makes valuable 
contributions to our appreciation of the Scottish tradition, with everything from 
tracing the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment (including Fletcher, Ferguson, 
                                                 
20 See also Neil Walker’s collection, MacCormick’s Scotland (2012). My own contribution (Del Mar 
2012), which offers a full bibliography of MacCormick’s works, also contains a bibliographical essay 
on Scottish sources and themes in his writings.  
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Smith and Hume) on the United States Constitution,21 to using Adam Smith’s device 
of the impartial spectator to modify Kant’s categorical imperative and set up an 
arguably more realistic, more earthy, and ultimately more human account of moral 
cognition (in MacCormick 2008).  
 The breadth of MacCormick’s reading here ought to also be noted: certainly, 
Stair, Hume and Smith feature prominently, but MacCormick also pays attention to, 
in addition to those mentioned above, the jurists, such as John Erskine, Lord Bankton, 
Lord Kames, and John Millar, and the philosophers, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas 
Reid, and Dugald Stewart. He was also very much aware of the history of scholars 
who had previously held his chair – the Chair of Public Law, and the Law of Nature 
and Nations at the University of Edinburgh – though, equally, he did not shy away 
from honestly evaluating their contributions (see ‘On Public Law and the Law of 
Nature and Nations’, 2007). Part of this was the result of his co-teaching – together 
with Hector MacQueen – a course on the Legal Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment 
– but part of it was also his own personal ‘addiction’ (as he once confessed)22 of the 
writings of many of these figures, perhaps especially Hume.  
 Indeed, Hume deserves to be singled out from this distinguished crowd. 
MacCormick is all too often characterised as a Hartian, or more generously, as 
someone who was once an all-out Hartian, and then (and increasingly) had second 
thoughts. MacCormick was himself somewhat responsible for this, occasionally 
characterising his own career as ‘pre-Hart, Hart and post-Hart’.23 But I think he is 
better thought of – if he must be associated with another thinker – as Humean. This is 
all the more helpful in that MacCormick often disagreed with Hume: indeed, an 
argument could be made that a good deal of MacCormick’s corpus can be seen as a 
dialogue with Hume.24 But the disagreements, no matter how fertile, should not hide 
from view the similarities and resonances between the two. Let me elaborate briefly 
on some of those, including substantive, stylistic and temperamental.  
 Beginning with the temperamental, and just to give a taste of this, consider the 
following statement from Knud Haakonssen in his introduction to Hume’s Political 
Essays: 
 
…one of the most provocative aspects of Hume’s political writings was his 
ability to find something to be said on both sides of most public questions, that 
is, to identify something to talk about. He juxtaposed opposing standpoints, 
often in semi-dialogue form, in order to make this explicit. Similarly he 
imitated ancient models of character drawing in order to convey the 
                                                 
21 See ‘Republicanism and Enlightenment Thought’ (1992).    
22 See ‘Does Law Really Matter?’, 2006, 19. Another phrase that MacCormick used in connection with 
Hume was that he was ‘a star-struck fan’ of Hume: MacCormick 2006, 9. It ought to be remembered 
that MacCormick was an Honorary Vice-President of the David Hume Institute 
(http://www.davidhumeinstitute.com) and included in their book commemorating their 25th anniversary 
(the excerpt included is from MacCormick’s Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 1978).  
23 See his contribution to Legal Philosophy: 5 Questions (2007). 
24 For instance, offering a respectful answer to Hume’s scepticism about the role of reason in human 
affairs – respectful because limited: yes, there was a role for reason, but this role had its limits. The 
pursuit of this challenge is evident from both Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 1978 through to 
Practical Reason in Law and Morality, 2008, and much else in between. MacCormick also sought to 
other challenges posed by Hume, for example consider MacCormick’s argument, pace Hume, for the 
compatibility of the rule of law and social welfare in the first chapter of Legal Right and Social 
Democracy (1982).  
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complexity of political personalities and thus get away from one-sided 
panegyric and denunciation. (Haakonssen 1994, xviii) 
 
A reader of MacCormick will recognise this feature as one that pervades 
MacCormick’s work: I have already mentioned the marrying up of Smith and Kant in 
MacCormick’s Smithian Categorical Imperative (2008), but there are many other 
examples, e.g. MacCormick’s attempt to learn from both, while not adopting either, 
the Hayekian right and the Marxist left in his Legal Right and Social Democracy 
(1982). The same characteristic is on show in MacCormick’s reviews of the works of 
others, or even in his general responsiveness to the views of those he did not share: 
there was always something one could learn, no matter how much disagreed.25  
 Another resonance is in the descriptive interest in genetic explanations of 
phenomena, as well the normative endorsement of gradualism – both of which are 
evidently present in Hume. The idea of the social (conventional) roots of property and 
money, and ultimately also law, are present from the beginning in Hume – certainly, 
in the Treatise, one hears Hume speak of how the stability of possession ‘arises 
gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience 
of the inconveniences of transgressing it’, or as Stein paraphrases it, ‘the gradual way 
in which men by force of habit come to accept certain conventions about property, 
which are justified by their utility in that particular society’ (see Stein 1980, 14). Or, 
consider this as an explanation of Hume’s theory of the emergence of law: 
 
We have first an emotion of approval or disapproval in a particular case; 
second, a judgment of approval or disapproval constituting a generalization as 
to the desirability of cases of this type; third, folkways, mores, and usages, 
informal non-institutionalized embodiments of previously formed judgments 
of approval or disapproval, but generally understood and commonly accepted 
as applying to all cases of this general class; finally, accepted institutions, 
culminating in law, the formal crystallization of the previously formed 
judgments of approval or disapproval, into express statutes, with definite 
penalties for violation. (Cairns, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel, 1949, 
379-80) 
 
Hume, of course, was by no means alone in this interest, and manner of explaining 
law: arguably, the strategy can be traced back to Montesquieu, and then subsequently 
his enthusiastic adoption in Scotland, in large part thanks to via the gregarious figure 
of Henry Home, Lord Kames. Stein refers colourfully to ‘Kames and his Salon’, 
saying of it that the kind of work it encouraged was precisely ‘the philosophical 
history of legal institutions’ (see Stein 1980, 30). Lord Kames’, and then Hume’s, 
mantle, was carried by Smith, who ‘had assimilated the teaching of Hume on the 
gradual development of conventions concerning property, and of Montesquieu 
concerning the relations of law to the particular circumstances of society’ (Stein 1980, 
30).26 Going back to the above passage describing Hume’s theory of the emergence of 
                                                 
25 These matters of character – one could say, MacCormick’s ethics of reading – have of course been 
noted by others: just to give one example, see Walker 2011.  
26 Hume needless to add was an accomplished historian – indeed, in his life time he was more famous 
as a historian than as a philosopher. There are different models of history at play in the Scottish 
Enlightenment – there is the philosophical history we tend to associate with Montesquieu and his ‘four 
stages’, and there is Hume’s history of England, to mention but two. It would be fascinating to delve 
more deeply into the models and methods of historiography, and more broadly the uses to which 
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law, there is certainly more than a hint in it as to how we could combine various 
elements of MacCormick’s corpus of work so as to form one coherent story, 
beginning with a portrait of the practical reason (including its affective dimension) of 
a norm-user, right through to the institutionalisation of the normative orders in which 
that norm-user participates in (indeed, I will attempt to flesh out this hint in the next 
section).  
 More substantively, it is interesting that whenever MacCormick spoke about 
the intellectual history of legal theory, especially about positivism, he was careful to 
place Hume, rather than Bentham, at its fountainhead (see MacCormick 1981).27 Of 
course, he realised that Bentham was influenced by Hume – indeed, he drew a line 
from Hume through to Bentham, Austin, Dicey and Hart, as well as from Hume to 
Hagerstrom, Lundstedt, Olivecrona and Ross (see MacCormick 1981, 100). But he 
was always very keen to remind us of the ‘pre-Benthamite’ era.28 More strongly, he 
once said that it might be best ‘intellectually interring our Austin and metaphorically 
burying our Bentham’ (at least temporarily) (see MacCormick 1983, 22). The reason 
for this is not difficult to find: where Hume’s sensibilities are diffusionist, Bentham’s 
and Austin’s are ‘sovereigntist’: ‘…it is easy to see’, MacCormick says, ‘Benthamite 
constitutionalism as the mainspring of the sovereigntist tendency, or certainly one of 
its most powerful buttresses. The insistence is that, while power may be delegated in 
various directions, it remains and ought to be secured as essentially unitary and 
central’ (MacCormick, ‘Might and Right’, 1998, 50). It is clear from MacCormick’s 
work that he positions his own institutionalist theory in opposition to the sovereigntist 
tendency he sees exemplified in Bentham and Austin, reaching back to Hobbes (but 
not, in this respect, Hume!):   
 
…the institutionalist way of looking at legal and political order opens up 
possibilities about pluralism. It makes possible, though not necessary, a degree 
                                                                                                                                            
history was put, in the Scottish Enlightenment. Indeed, MacCormick lamented the neglect of this aspect 
of the Scottish Enlightenment: he said, for instance, in an early paper on ‘Smith on Law’ (1980-1) that 
‘the attempts of the Scottish moralists to account for the historical development of legal orders within 
theories of economy and society has been altogether too much neglected since then’ (243), and about 
Smith in particular, MacCormick observed, with enthusiasm, that Smith ‘combined, as the basic 
elements of the economy of different forms of human society, a theory of natural rights with a theory of 
the social development of laws and legal institutions’ (245). MacCormick continued to stress this 
aspect of the Scottish Enlightenment throughout his career, e.g. referring to the ‘broadly evolutionary 
theory of law-in-society’ of Scottish thinkers, singling out Hume, Smith and Millar (MacCormick 
2007, 153).   
27 It is interesting that there is little engagement in MacCormick’s corpus with Hobbes – after all, 
Hobbes also the uses the term ‘commonwealth’. Of course, Hobbes’s commonwealth is very different 
to Hume’s – where Hume’s is shot through with the diffusion of power, Hobbes’s is very much in 
favour of its centralisation and concentration. As Berns puts it: ‘A commonwealth [for Hobbes] must 
be constituted as one legal person by a great multitude of men, each of whom covenants with all the 
others to regard the will of this legal, civil, or artificial person as his own will. This legal person, the 
sovereign, ‘is’ the commonwealth. In practical terms this means that every subject should regard all 
actions of the sovereign power as actions of his own, all legislation by the sovereign as his own self-
legislation’: Berns in Strauss and Cropsey, eds. History of Political Philosophy, 1987, 404-5). This is 
almost the negation of subsidiarity and self-government at many levels. Whether this is a fair 
assessment of Hobbes is of course another matter. No doubt, if he looked closer, MacCormick would 
have found more to learn from Hobbes, e.g. consider the fact that in the Leviathan, chapters 13 to 15, 
Hobbes starts not from the top down with a definition of law but from the bottom up with a psychology 
of the person in social interactions (see Hardin). Thus there might have been some resonances at a 
methodological level. 
28 See, for example, his ‘Dworkin as Pre-Benthamite’ (1978).  
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of opposition to traditional centralising theories about sovereignty, its 
absoluteness, and its essential quality for securely established law. In place, 
we can put ideas about subsidiarity, negotiation, balance between different 
forms and levels of government and self-government. This is not necessarily 
an easy way of looking at law, or of running a society. The problems about 
societal insecurity that lie at the heart of Hobbes’s vision of the human 
condition, and that continue to animate Bentham and Austin, are real 
problems. The diffusionist picture is a happy one from many points of view, 
but its proponents must show that the Hobbesian problems can be handled 
even without strong central authorities, last-resort sovereigns for all purposes. 
(MacCormick, ‘Might and Right’, 1998, 62)29 
 
Typically, MacCormick still tries to learn from those he disagrees – here, Hobbes, 
Bentham and Austin. But his sympathies are clear: where Bentham & Co are 
sovereigntist in their tendency, he – like Hume – is a diffusionist (with apologies for 
the length of the quote):  
 
The diffusionist tendency can be read more boldly as pointing towards 
something altogether less monolithic than the Benthamite conception either of 
law or of constitution. It points towards acknowledging a plurality of 
interlocking sets of standards of right and wrong, operated by different 
authorities in different spheres of responsibility. These spheres of 
responsibility engage in some cases larger, in some cases smaller, participant 
populations to take part in one or another scheme of collective self-
government. Perhaps it is not, or will over time prove not to be, necessary to 
have or to assert a single all-purpose supreme authority. Certainly, if there 
were none, the situation emerging would require careful management at all 
levels to avoid deadlock or damaging conflict among rival authorities. Each 
level would need to respect the sphere of competence of every other, and there 
would have to be ongoing dialogue to secure common understanding of the 
scope and limits of various authorities. A diffusion of legal theory would 
entail a parallel diffusion of political power. Those who hold power at 
particular levels or for particular purposes would be likely to find themselves 
subject to checks and controls on their action that emanate from different 
authorities, [53] and are not amenable to change by processes in the power of 
those controlled by them. To cope intellectually with such developments 
would require a legal theory that is pluralistic rather than a monistic in its 
approach to legal and political order… (MacCormick, ‘Might and Right’, 
1998, 54) 
 
There is a striking parallel to be drawn between this passage and the way in which 
MacCormick draws on Hume’s essay, ‘On the Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’. 
MacCormick engaged with this essay explicitly in an address to the David Hume 
Institute in 2006, arguing that there was much to learn from Hume’s notion of a 
commonwealth in our efforts to understand and improve contemporary Europe. As 
MacCormick saw it, Hume’s essay was concerned with how best to tame democracy – 
Hume ‘favoured democratic government’, hence his use of the term ‘commonwealth’, 
                                                 
29 Dicey was also often treated in this vein, e.g. ‘With Bentham and Austin, and with Dicey’s 
apotheosis of the dubious doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, the 10th century in Britain marked the 
near total triumph of juridical voluntarism’: see ‘Future of Legal Systems’, 1990, 15. 
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which in the 18th century ‘meant a democratic polity as distinct from a tyranny or a 
constitutional monarchy or an aristocracy or oligarchy’ (MacCormick 2006, 2). But 
Hume also acknowledged that democracy was a ‘problematic form of government’ 
(MacCormick 2006, 2), and he set about providing a model, based perhaps 
surprisingly on the organisation of the Kirk (Church) in Scotland, that would bring 
governance to the people while avoiding the dangers of mob rule. The details of 
Hume’s scheme are not important here – essentially, he advised that we ‘Divide the 
people into many separate bodies and then they may debate with safety and every 
inconvenience seems to be prevented’ (Hume quoted in MacCormick 2006, 13) – but 
what is interesting is what MacCormick saw in it and how he applied it to 
contemporary concerns.  
 One feature of Hume’s approach that MacCormick singled out was that, as a 
result of breaking up the polity into many bodies (and requiring proposals for 
legislation to be sent between the senate and this diffuse assembly of the people), 
government was decidedly slower. MacCormick saw this as a virtue: ‘This is a kind 
of government’, he said, ‘which can’t be hurried into rapid and rash decisions… 
effective democratic government is inefficient – it is deliberately inefficient’ 
(MacCormick 2006, 16). Further, democracy, as envisaged by Hume, and endorsed by 
MacCormick, is a ‘complexification device. Democracy demands that even what 
seems obvious to nearly everybody must be discussed before it is enacted’ 
(MacCormick 2006, 16). Summing up, MacCormick concluded that ‘If you believe in 
democracy, you necessarily believe in complex and often slow decision-making in 
government’ (2006, 17).  
Interestingly, though broken up, in Hume’s scheme the people all contributed 
to a common decision. Put more clearly, democracy, as Hume saw it, was easier in a 
bigger polity: ‘Take a large country’, said MacCormick paraphrasing Hume, ‘where 
people live in places far distant from each other, and you can establish an 
appropriately structured republic. Distance and diversity will render it free from the 
evils of faction and from any opportunity for excessive influence by demagogues’ 
(MacCormick 2006, 18). And later, similarly:    
 
Distant and remote parts may not share any particularly strong anterior sense 
of cultural or social community with others equally distant and remote. Yet all 
can contribute to a common decision making process, provided they are 
brought into a broadly fair balance. A sense of community or of ‘peoplehood’ 
is more likely to be a consequence of participating together in a common 
enterprise of democratic self-government than a necessary precondition for 
establishing such a process. (MacCormick 2006, 28)30 
 
It may not come as a surprise that MacCormick thought this model could be applied 
successfully in Europe. ‘It was vital’, MacCormick argued, ‘that in some sense the EU 
becomes better connected to the European people’ (MacCormick 2006, 10). How was 
this to be achieved? Well, Hume’s model provides an answer – the manner in which it 
can be realised in Europe is via ‘subsidiarity’, including the specific proposal for its 
                                                 
30 MacCormick added (2006, 18) that this aspect of Hume’s account must have influenced Madison, 
Hamilton, Jay and other Federalists in the US in the late 18th century. I am not suggesting MacCormick 
would always endorse this aspect of Hume’s essay – just that it was convenient in the context of his 
applying it to the EU. 
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enhancement in the Draft Constitution for Europe.31 As he puts it explicitly, ‘The 
subsidiarity proposal in the Constitution…more or less replicates the Humean idea of 
passing a proposal back down the line’ (MacCormick 2006, 27). By no means does 
this mean attempting to ‘create a single cohesive sense of collective popular 
“selfhood” on a European scale’ (MacCormick 2006, 28) – to the contrary: 
 
Subsidiarity for ever! What emerges will not be the decision of an imagined 
‘demos’ which doesn’t exist. But democracy does not mean rule by a single 
personified demos, Volk, or the people. It means a system of rule in which 
everybody affected gets a say on broadly equal terms in circumstances of fair 
and broadly equal opportunities of political participation. (MacCormick 2006, 
29) 
 
There were others in the canon of Scottish thought that could be drawn on to further 
flesh out the importance of active political participation, and notably in a thoroughly 
diffusionist spirit. Thus, for instance, Andrew Fletcher could be enlisted to argue that 
the liberty of a community depended on its capacity to take political initiative. For 
Fletcher, this meant political communities needed to be kept ‘manageably small’, so 
as ‘to build a regard for the public good upon the sense of loyalty to community, 
which the ancient tradition of small polities fosters’ (MacCormick 2004, 101). This 
was obviously connected to Fletcher’s opposition to union between Scotland and 
England, his view being that such a union ‘would remove from Scotland all 
independence of political initiative, depriving it of that theatre of representative 
politics in which, he considered, civic virtue and the opportunity for dedication to the 
public good of one’s community can alone be realised’ (MacCormick 2006, 100). 
This was clearly a view MacCormick was sympathetic to – arguing as he did, so 
forcefully, from early on in his career (e.g. see MacCormick 2007) for a Parliament 
for Scotland (quite separately from any ambition for independence).32   
 While Fletcher was a pioneer, it was Adam Ferguson who is, according to 
MacCormick, ‘the classic representative’ of the ‘theory of smallness as favourable to 
liberty’ (MacCormick 2004, 102). Ferguson, who drew heavily on the Greek and 
Italian civic republics of antiquity, stressed that it was the links, fostered by those 
republics, between the individual and community, that encouraged the formation of 
personal and communal virtues, and that enabled citizens to make ‘independent 
contributions to the commonweal out of their own commitment to it and their own 
judgement of what is required’ (MacCormick 2004, 102). It is important to underscore 
here that the community in question is not envisaged as a homogeneous one, where 
everyone agrees on the best way forward. Quite the contrary (here paraphrasing 
Ferguson, with approval):  
 
The good emerges not from bland consensus but, like truth, from the vigorous 
dissensus of passionate debate. The end should not be the extinguishment of 
faction but the securing of pluralism and overall equilibrium among factions. 
                                                 
31 MacCormick was a member of the Convention on the Future of Europe, which was responsible for 
drafting the Constitution. 
32 Consider the following from his introduction to that collection on The Scottish Debate (1970): 
‘Despite being unconvinced that independence would be the best course for Scotland or for the rest of 
Britain, I am a member of the Scottish National Party, since it seems to me abundantly clear that 
neither of the two large parties is likely to take the smallest step towards any worthwhile form of self-
government for Scotland…’ (2).  
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It is from the tension among vigorously held and hard-won contentions that a 
real conception of and regard for public good emerges. Such a spirit is also 
essential to the preservation of individual and political liberty. (MacCormick 
2004, 102) 
 
Dissensus, then, in circumstances of diffusion – a worthy heritage indeed, and one 
MacCormick never tired of recalling.  
 I have, of course, barely scratched the surface here of what MacCormick drew 
from his Scottish predecessors. To mention but one more idea, with an eye to the next 
section, the notion of civility or civil society, which looms large in MacCormick’s 
institutionalism (especially in his Institutions of Law, 2007), is one MacCormick took 
from Scottish thinking, especially from Smith. For instance, MacCormick once 
observed that our ‘capacity to communicate and accumulate knowledge… implies a 
capability to develop a more and more extensive civil society, in turn requiring an 
extension of at least provisional trust across an ever-wider range of people who are 
not personally acquainted with each other – and here says the idea is familiar to any 
reader of Adam Smith’ (MacCormick, ‘On Public Law’, 2007, 159). Crucially, this 
understanding of civility as ‘impersonal trust’, with its ‘sense of duty and obligation 
to each other’, develops and flourishes ‘prior to any authoritative imposition of rules 
upon us’ (MacCormick, ‘On Public Law’, 2007, 160). The very capacity to speak 
language, and speak with sincerity,33 illustrates that we can be civil to each other 
without the explicit articulation of norms, formality or authority. This is very 
important to MacCormick, who stressed that ‘we humans are norm-users before we 
are norm-creators, or legislators’, and for whom the development of ‘civil institutions’ 
would have been impossible if it were not for this capacity for informal, un-
institutionalised, norm-using (see MacCormick, ‘On Public Law’, 2007, 160). In the 
context of the above, what I would emphasise is that there is a link here between the 
descriptive observation that we are norm-users before we are norm-givers, and the 
normative commitment to enabling active political participation of individuals in the 
self-government of their communities.  
 
 
II.C. Norm-Users and Institutionalisation  
 
We have now, I hope, sufficient momentum and inspiration to offer, at least in 
necessarily schematic form, some suggestions for reconstructing MacCormick’s 
legacy. Here is roughly how we could proceed to reconstruct MacCormick’s general 
jurisprudence: 
 
1. It would make sense to begin with the processes of norm-using, at their most 
informal and non-institutionalised. Good examples of these processes will be 
the practice of communicating in language, together with the various norms or 
virtues we might reasonably ascribe to those practices, e.g. in the case of 
speaking a language, the norm or virtue of sincerity.34  
 
                                                 
33 The virtue of sincerity, especially insofar as it is linked to the way language works socially, is one 
that re-appears throughout MacCormick’s work, see e.g. ‘What is Wrong with Deceit?’ (1983), and 
chapter 2 of Practical Reason in Law and Morality (2008).  
34 There is an obvious link here with Bernard Williams’ Truth and Truthfulness (2002).  
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2. These processes can be conceived of as normative orders: norm-users 
participate in normative orders, and they do so in virtue of sharing, though in a 
very rough and at best overlapping way, some sense (not necessarily 
articulate) of what is right and wrong (or, probably better, wrong and not-
wrong) within that normative order. The form of participation in normative 
orders is inherently interactive: in the course of participation, mutual beliefs, 
containing mutual expectations about correct and incorrect conduct, arise and 
stabilise over time.    
 
3. While beginning with these processes of norm-using, it would be important 
not to lose sight of the norm-user. Certainly, normative orders develop in the 
course of interaction between persons who, thereby, over time, become norm-
users. But at any given time, any one norm-user will be born and grow up in a 
variety of normative orders that pre-existed them. They will thus be 
confronted with these normative orders heteronomously, and if they develop, 
as they can as they ought, they will begin to reflect on at least certain aspects 
of these orders in an autonomous way.  
 
4. Keeping in mind both processes – i.e. the process of heteronomous 
enculturation of norm-users as well as the development of their individual 
normative consciences – is important, for presumably even the most 
developed normative conscience is not so autonomous as to be bereft of 
heteronomous influence of norms that they have not yet subjected to scrutiny 
and reflection. Understanding these processes would be assisted by running 
the two strands of reason and emotion together, recognising 1) the role of 
observing and indeed experiencing the reactions of others (to whom do they 
express sympathy to, for what reason, and in what degree) in enculturation; 
and 2) the role of sympathy in guiding one’s use of universalisation as part of 
the development of an autonomous normative conscience. 
 
5. In conceptualising normative order, we recognise that this involves judgement: 
normative orders are not static, they develop and change, and they do so 
(often, if not always) as a result of a judgement of how to go on given 
something unexpected, in response to some disruption of the order (e.g. 
someone jumping the queue, but with a potentially valid reason). This 
judgement can be exercised in an ad hoc way by the norm-users themselves, 
but a decision can also be taken to invite a third party – not themselves 
directly, in that moment, a participant in the relevant normative order – to 
assist with making a judgement, which is then more likely to be accepted as 
legitimate by the norm-users (given that it is being made by someone without 
a direct stake in the outcome). Thus, the first stage of institutionalisation – at 
this point, at the extreme end of a low degree – is that of an ad hoc third party 
exercising judgement upon a particular event in a particular normative order 
that requires judgement about how to go on.  
 
6. The second stage of institutionalisation involves standardising that practice of 
third-party judgement, and this can bring along with it various related 
practices, each of which can be understood as further intensifying 
institutionalisation. These related practices include: 1) articulating the norms 
that might be said to govern the relevant normative order and that one wants 
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the third-party to use when making judgements with respect to that order 
(while being aware that no such articulation will be exhaustive, both in the 
sense that it will subject to interpretation and in the sense that that 
interpretation is bound to take into account values one might see as underlying 
the normative order); and 2) articulating the rules thanks to which the 
standardisation of third-party judgement is to occur (i.e. establishing the 
institution of adjudication, including, e.g. the process of selection and 
appointment of the adjudicators, their jurisdiction, etc.). What is crucial to see 
here is that the institution – in the sense of a social institution that, through its 
members, carries out the task of judgment – can carry out its work before the 
creation of rules that regulate it (in a formal sense, even establish it), and 
carries on its task in ways that are not exhaustively explained by either the 
norms it is expected to apply or the rules that govern that institution’s 
operation.35  
 
7. One can be more or less complex in the ways in which one articulates the 
norms that might be said to govern the relevant normative order and that one 
wants the third-party to use when making judgements with respect to that 
order. Certain formulations of norms with respect to certain normative orders 
– for instance, the norm of waiting one’s turn in a queue – will be relatively 
                                                 
35 This is a vital point that would require a good deal more unpacking than I can afford here. What is 
important is that we pry apart, and indeed give primacy to, institutions (in the sense of social 
institutions performing certain functions) from rules that can be said (in a certain mode of talking) to 
constitute them. Thus, this means resisting the common tendency to define institutions in terms of 
rules. For an illustration of the importance of this, consider the following criticism of Hart’s alleged 
‘reduction of institutions to rules’ by Robert Summers (1963, this being a paper cited by MacCormick 
as one of his sources for his Inaugural Lecture on ‘Law as Institutional Fact’, 1974) – Summers 
outlines the following dangers of this reduction: ‘First, there is some risk that what is truly primary and 
what is truly secondary will be inverted…. Rules alone cannot do the job; and they are only means to 
the end – they merely specific who is to do the job and how it is to be done. Secondly, if legal 
institutions are thought of as aggregations of rules, there is some danger that this may ‘obscure the 
distinctive characteristics of law and of the activities possible within its framework’. Thus, for 
example, if courts and administrative agencies are compared as functioning institutions we will readily 
see that administrative agencies typically have much more ‘leeway’ within the legal framework than do 
courts. This difference is in many ways an important fact and is obscured by viewing courts and 
agencies not as functioning institutions but as aggregations of rules. Thirdly, to concentrate on the rules 
is to obscure the role of the personalities of the officials who administer the system… Fourth, emphasis 
on the concept of rule rather than on the conception of a functioning social institutions may, in some 
cases, obscure the true character of ‘legal’ action. Some actions of legal institutions are, in a sense, 
beyond the rules. Thus courts resolve uncertainties in the ‘rule of recognition. When [644] this involves 
a judgement that the court itself has power to decide, and when there is no higher court of appeal, we 
should here view the court’s action as that of a social institution successfully bidding for power rather 
than as the action of a creature of law dissolvable into rules of jurisdiction’ (Summers 1963, 644-645). 
That this was taken seriously by MacCormick is evident from his dual account of the institutionality of 
law, namely, what he calls the ‘philosophical sense’ of institutions (such as contract or trust, which are 
comprised of institutive, consequential, and terminative rules) and the ‘sociological sense’, which are 
precisely the social institutions and their functions (see MacCormick 1974). Another source mentioned 
by MacCormick in his Inaugural Lecture was Karl Llewellyn’s ‘The Constitution as an Institution’ 
(1934), in which Llewellyn defines an institution as ‘in the first instance a set of ways of living and 
doing. It is not, in first instance, a matter of words or rules’ (17). Given these sources, it is no surprise 
that MacCormick is at pains to point out that though ‘many important elements of law can be profitably 
contemplated as institutions facts in the philosophical sense…we cannot squeeze the whole of the law 
into that category; in other aspects it can only be comprehended as an institutional phenomenon in the 
sociological sense. Jurisprudence is, and must remain, a joint adventure of lawyers, philosophers and 
sociologists’ (MacCormick 1974, 129). 
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simple, while others – such as those establishing and governing the concept of 
contract or trust – will be more complex. These more complex articulations 
can be understood by way of three sets of rules: institutive, consequential and 
terminative. One can also call these ‘institutions’, though more in the sense of 
concepts than function-performing standardised practices (such as those of 
judgement in adjudicative institutions). There will be numerous choices to 
make in one’s articulation of these kinds of institutions, including degrees of 
specificity in articulation (ranging from rules to standards, with accompanying 
degrees of discretion). How these choices are made, and by whom, can itself 
develop into the practice of a particular social institution (that of norm-
making, and thus legislative institutions). This process of articulation, with all 
of its different choices, including the processes by which such articulation is 
achieved, can be understood as stage three.  
 
8. As soon as one has more than one standardised practice of judgement – and 
thus multiple institutions of adjudication – a further level of complexity is 
reached, which can be called ‘stage four’. What can appear at this stage are 
various informal processes of mutual reference / accommodation / deference 
between such institutions, and these can of course occur at various levels of 
intensity and density. These informal processes can themselves come to be 
regulated by more explicit norms (such as we have, for instance, within private 
international law) in the form of rules or standards for managing jurisdictional 
overlap or conflict.  
 
9. At some point – and one can see this as stage five – the articulation of the 
norms in question may be such as to benefit from seeing them as forming a 
kind of unity. The need for this can arise in various ways, including for the 
purposes of education and perhaps also adjudication. What is crucial to 
acknowledge is that no matter how systematic a picture is constructed of these 
various articulated norms, that picture remains a ‘regulative ideal’ – it does not 
represent reality, but offers a construction that may be beneficial for certain 
purposes. Of course, there may be times when such a construction would not 
be beneficial, and fragmentation in the form of competition between the 
various social institutions and their ‘institutions of law’ is seen to be more 
useful. Again, it is better to conceive of such attempts at constructing unity as 
one kind of process that can occur, with contrasting processes, emphasising 
the virtues of specialisation and fragmentation, also occurring, sometimes 
simultaneously.  
 
10. It is important to emphasise that throughout the various stages of 
institutionalisation one does not lose sight of the effects of those various 
degrees of institutionalisation on the practical reason of norm- (and institution) 
users. To the extent it becomes useful to think of norm-users as either citizens 
or officials, it also becomes crucial that the practical reasoning of citizens is 
not lost sight of.36   
                                                 
36 Consider the following from MacCormick’s 1990 paper, ‘Citizens’ Legal Reasoning’: ‘Whatever 
else practical reason and law have in common, they ought to share this: ordinary people have to think 
about how law does and should enter into their conduct and planning of their person affairs, their 
collective affairs with friends and partners and, indeed, their corporate and communal affairs at large’ 
(15).  
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The boundaries between the various stages are not sharp – they can overlap, e.g. stage 
three develops within and to a certain extent part of stage two (recall, for example, the 
fact that judges in early English law were also legislators). Furthermore, although the 
stages are conceived of as successive, one can imagine particular cases in which some 
later stages appear earlier. Finally, no claim is made that it is only upon reaching a 
certain stage that one has legality – the argument is that legality is better conceived of 
in degrees of institutionalisation, with a low degree of legality present at a low degree 
of institutionalisation, and a high degree of legality present at a high degree of 
institutionalisation.  
 Of course, this is but a sketch, and it is a sketch, furthermore, that has been 
articulated in descriptive mode: it is offered as a way of tracking the emergence of 
legality, conceived of as relative institutionalisation, initially from, but always relating 
it in various ways to, informal, non-institutionalised processes of norm-using. 
Although this conception – a reconstruction of MacCormick’s institutionalism – has 
been presented in descriptive mode, this ought not to mask the fact that it is suffused 
with a particular normative commitment, namely that to the diffusion of power.  
 What loom large in the above model are the processes of normative order and 
the practical reason of norm-users. Although there is recognition built in of the 
capacity for legality, depending on its level of relative institutionalisation, to move 
somewhat away from everyday processes of normative order, the connection between 
institutionalisation and normative order is always maintained – for instance, there is 
continuous tracking within this model of the exercise of practical reason by norm- and 
institution- users. Contrast this with an account of the emergence of law as a matter of 
the exercise of the will (in a position of power). Legality, on the above model, is an 
associational concept – not a voluntaristic, or even a rationalist one.37  
That being said, it must be acknowledged that the democratic credentials of 
the above model are only contingent. Certainly, they at least open up the possibility of 
a conception of legality where varying degrees of institutionalisation emerge from the 
practices of norm-users; or, to put it differently, what is important is that the cards are 
not stacked, from the outset, in favour of the exercise of some sovereign will. 
However, there is of course no guarantee that, as soon as certain levels of 
institutionalisation are reached, these will not become so removed and detached from 
the norm-users they affect as to be undemocratic and tyrannical. The relationship 
between law and power, on this view, can take several forms – some more diffusionist 
and some more sovereigntist. But, unlike in some conceptions of law, the odds are not 
against the diffusionist – if anything, the way legality is conceived on this view alerts 
us to the temporal primacy, and thereafter continuous presence, of norm-users.  
Equally, it is not the case that the above model endorses any position on 
nationalism – but it should not come as a surprise that someone with such a model 
should be sympathetic to the idea of respecting those individuals who treat as valuable 
the commitment to their own institutions (especially social institutions, but perhaps 
also institutions of law), this being precisely civic nationalism and the only form of 
                                                 
37 To the extent there is something one might call ‘natural law’, it is conceived of that which naturally 
accompanies the development of language, e.g. precisely the norm or virtue of sincerity. By nature, we 
might say, we are norm-users, and we might even develop a thin account of the kinds of norms, given 
certain practices (such as speaking language) that we are likely to develop – but nothing stronger than 
this. 
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nationalism that MacCormick championed.38 MacCormick’s nationalism is obviously 
a complex topic, and one that changed shape over the course of MacCormick’s career, 
but perhaps one note about it can be offered given the above discussion: we should 
not get too hung up on ‘nationalism’; the key, instead, is MacCormick’s keen sense of 
the value of each individual. His is not a classic liberalism in the sense that he spoke 
in favour of schemes of redistribution39 and even (limited) moral establishment,40 but 
there is certainly an unshakeable and consistent recognition of the value of self-
government, beginning with the individual and emanating outwards to what the 
individual treats as valuable. My argument has been that diffusionism, and the 
associated conception of legality as relative institutionalisation, were both vital parts, 
and perhaps the key expressions, of that attitude.    
 
 
II.D. Transnational Legal Theory 
 
Finally, it remains to offer a few observations about how and why the above 
reconstruction of MacCormick’s contribution, is important for transnational legal 
theory. In the interests of space, let me offer but three much-too short observations.  
First, and perhaps most obviously, I would argue that an approach to legality 
that treats it as an emergent property – emerging, in particular, from already 
normative relations, in varying degrees of density – will be particularly suited to the 
transnational realm. As others have argued, the transnational realm requires an 
approach to law that respects the capacity of individuals to relate to each other 
normatively in the absence of already established, let alone already legitimate, 
authorities. This is not to say we can be naïve about the presence of power in the 
transnational: to the contrary, powers are exercised, and still, and perhaps 
increasingly, without much transparency or control. What it does mean is that we 
must enable ourselves to see the gradual rise of multiple voices, all making a 
normative input, some stabilising into various degrees of formality. Although we 
cannot treat all that is happening at the transnational level as bottom-up, neither can 
we conceive of law to such an extent that we only ever look top-down. So an 
approach that has its ear to the ground, so to speak, and is sensitive to dynamics over 
time,41 is surely much needed to help us make sense of what is happening 
transnationally.  
Second, and less obviously, but no less importantly, we need to keep two balls 
in the air: the normative and the descriptive. This is particularly important for the 
transnational, where there is great scope for exploitation of vulnerability. This is why 
an approach that at least makes it possible to connect legality to those whom it most 
affects – to keep, by diffusing power, institutionalisation close to norm-users – is so 
important. But it is one thing to make it possible, and another to make it desirable. 
One might argue, for example, that some forms of self-government in the 
transnational are precisely the problem: private powers setting their own standards for 
their own behaviour, which fall far short of what is required. There might be scope for 
the argument that some forms of centralisation or concentration of power are, at 
                                                 
38 MacCormick was clear that the value of nationalism was contingent on individuals treating their 
commitment to collective civic institutions valuable.  
39 See ‘Legal Right and Social Democracy’, chapter 1 of the book under the same title (1982). 
40 See ‘Against Moral Disestablishment’, chapter 2 of Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982). 
41 I have only spoken of institutionalisation here, but one must also pay attention to de-
institutionalisation. 
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times, warranted – if only to curb the greater danger of another power. A model of 
legality as relative institutionalisation, understood to be suffused with a commitment 
to diffusion of power, does not necessarily lead to a certain kind of normative theory: 
instead, it serves as a reminder not to lose sight of certain things, e.g. the practices of 
norm-users and what they treat as normative and as valuable. But the fact that a 
certain descriptive model does not lead to a certain normative theory ought not to be 
an obstacle to us recognising the dynamic relationship between the descriptive and the 
normative. 
Third, theorising the transnational necessitates combining the strengths of a 
number of disciplines. Right from the beginning, and in a way that I hope has been 
clear from the above reconstruction, MacCormick was committed to combining the 
strengths of philosophy and sociology, and to a lesser extent, history. All three are 
vital for engaging with the transnational (though equally with any other realm).42 
There are various ways to characterise this triad, e.g. the conceptual, the empirical and 
the diachronic. The point is that there must be methodological balance: one offers 
hypotheses (concepts, models) on the basis of certain observations (most probably at 
first haphazard impressions); one then returns to testing those hypotheses in a more 
rigorous regime of observation, including both contemporary and diachronic; and one 
rejects and starts again, or refines and makes more subtle one’s concepts and models. 
This all sounds rather abstract, and probably unhelpful, so let me make one claim 
here: if one maintains this methodological balance, one should end up with a series of 
variables that come in degrees. It is hopeless, and especially in the case of the 
transnational, to draw sharp lines between, say, social and legal norms, or between 
law and morality, or law and politics. One must find ways of articulating relations 
between them, and this means coming up with concepts and models that help us see 
how certain variables, when they reach a certain degree, are usefully thought of as, 
say, having a good deal of legality. Put differently, thinking in variables and degrees 
helps us to see those relations. MacCormick’s model of legality as relative 
institutionalisation, as reconstructed here, has that built in. In this, as in many places, 
being ambiguous means being clear.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Part of the aim of this paper has been to show how a descriptive model – in this case, 
the general jurisprudential model of legality as relative institutionalisation – is 
illuminated by awareness of a scholar’s normative sensibility, in this case, 
MacCormick’s commitment to the diffusion of power. I choose the word ‘sensibility’ 
advisedly: when evaluating a scholar’s legacy, we need look wider and (again, dare I 
say) deeper, constructing our best sense of what a scholar valued and was most 
anxious about. But I need to end with a disclaimer: this paper is part of a broader 
project in which I attempt to offer an overall picture, perhaps a narrative, of 
MacCormick’s ideas, set in the context of the political and scholarly events he 
participated in. I feel the responsibility of that project very keenly – indeed, I cannot 
think of a heavier scholarly responsibility than the ethics involved in reading 
another’s work. So I offer the above as the beginning of a dialogue about 
MacCormick’s contribution, and I expect and hope for as much dissensus as possible!    
                                                 
42 The historical has been the most neglected of these. A number of scholars are changing that, e.g. 
Christopher Thornhill.  
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